The Protecting Our Democracy Act (PODA) is an historic package of pro-democracy reforms to create or strengthen guardrails that help to prevent abuses of executive power and corruption, make the presidency more transparent and effective, and establish that no president is above the law. PODA ensures that all presidents will put the public’s interest above their own and not use their office for personal gain. Protect Democracy strongly supports these vital reforms.
Without these important legislative measures, our democracy is at risk of backsliding into a more authoritarian form of government in which the president wields unchecked power — the very danger our constitutional system was designed to forestall.
In the 117th Congress, PODA passed the House on December 9, 2021, on a bipartisan vote of 220-208. On March 11, 2022 two provisions of PODA passed in the omnibus spending bill: power of the purse provisions from Title V and Intelligence Community inspector general reforms from Title VII. PODA was reintroduced in the 118th by Congressman Adam Schiff (CA-30) on July 27, 2023.
PODA comprises an array of reforms, which have received broad support in Congress and from civil society organizations across the ideological spectrum.
The proposals respond to longstanding vulnerabilities in our democracy that have allowed for the aggrandizement of presidential power, many of which have been exploited over decades by presidents of both parties, and some of which reached new heights through the actions of the Trump administration. PODA responds to these abuses as lessons from which both parties must learn.
The Constitution grants the president broad power to issue pardons for federal crimes — but that power is not unlimited and cannot be used for corrupt ends. The Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act would deter presidents from abusing the pardon power by increasing transparency into the pardon-granting process and by clarifying bans on self-pardons and pardons used for corrupt ends.
Articles about the measure include: Martha Kinsella, Daniel Weiner of the Brennan Center for Justice, “After four years of abuse, tangible fixes abound for restoring the rule of law.” (The Fulcrum)
Background
Presidents enjoy broad constitutional power to grant clemency for federal crimes. Article II (Section 2, Clause 1) provides that the president “shall have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of impeachment.”
In 2017, President Trump claimed that this power was “complete.” The assertion echoed a longstanding position of the executive branch. President Wilson’s attorney general claimed that the “President, in his action on pardon cases, is not subject to the control or supervision of anyone, nor is he accountable in any way to any branch of the government for his action.” President Clinton’s attorney general similarly advised him that any cooperation with congressional oversight of his pardon power would be entirely voluntary.
However, the president’s power to issue pardons and commutations is not absolute, but rather is constrained by other provisions of the Constitution, including the system of checks and balances it establishes and the individual rights it protects. Use of the pardon power to place the president above the law, undermine the constitutional powers of another branch, undermine the Bill of Rights, obstruct justice, or as a bribe is unconstitutional and an abuse of executive power.
Presidents in recent decades have pushed the limits of the pardon power in ways that erode the rule of law. President Clinton was investigated by federal prosecutors for a last-minute pardon of Marc Rich in 2001 on suspicions of a quid pro quo for donations. President Trump repeatedly floated the possibility of a self-pardon, which would have set a dangerous precedent for presidents attempting to place themselves above the law. President Trump’s counsel discussed the possibility of pardons with Michael Flynn’s and Paul Manafort’s counsel, and President Trump wielded the pardon power in ways that may have been intended to obstruct criminal investigations, shield himself from criminal exposure, and thwart congressional oversight.
To ensure future presidents cannot hold themselves above the law, the pardon power needs reform. Congress should clarify its limits and increase transparency into the pardon-granting process.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would respond to this by:
Federal law generally sets a five-year statute of limitations for prosecuting criminal offenses. Yet it is the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) policy not to charge a sitting president with a federal crime, despite the fact that statutes of limitations would continue to run during the president’s term in office. DOJ’s policy can therefore allow a president to avoid criminal accountability, especially if the president serves two terms. Because the presidency affords temporary immunity from prosecution, statutes of limitations should also be temporarily paused to ensure that no president is above the law.
Articles about the measure include: Amanda Lineberry and Chuck Rosenberg, “Equitable Tolling and the Prosecution of a President.” (Lawfare)
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would toll — or pause — for the duration of a president’s tenure in office the statute of limitations for any federal crime committed by a president or vice president before or during their term.
The Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution seek to prevent foreign influences from corrupting presidents and other federal officials by preventing them from accepting emoluments — namely any profit, gain, advantage, or payment — from a foreign government without prior congressional consent. The president is also barred from accepting emoluments from Congress or any U.S. state or local government beyond his or her official salary. Unfortunately, because there is currently no statutory enforcement mechanism, presidents and other public officials have sometimes escaped accountability for violations of these constitutional provisions.
The Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Enforcement Act is Title III of the Protecting Our Democracy Act. This bill was introduced as standalone legislation (S.3181) in the 117th Congress by Senator Richard Blumenthal.
Articles about the measure include:
Background
Through the Emoluments Clauses, the framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to deter corruption and foreign meddling by barring the president and other high federal officials from accepting an emolument — namely any profit, gain, advantage, or payment — from a foreign government without congressional consent. The president is also barred from accepting any benefit from the federal or state governments beyond the presidential salary.
Early presidential practice reflected an understanding of emoluments as a broad range of gifts, payments or other advantages – with presidents seeking congressional consent to accept even such items as a gold medal. Over time, presidents and other government officials have voluntarily sought to comply with the prohibitions on emoluments, including by divesting themselves from business interests or holdings that would create potential violations. Former President Trump broke with this practice by refusing to divest from his business and financial interests after becoming president despite those interests involving payments from foreign and U.S. government entities, and by rejecting the longstanding interpretation of what constitutes an emolument.
Because the Constitution does not provide an express enforcement mechanism for the Emoluments Clauses, lawsuits from members of Congress, state attorneys general, businesses, and nonprofits against President Trump faced significant procedural hurdles and ultimately were either dismissed on standing grounds or mooted once his term expired.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would give force to the constitutional emoluments provisions by codifying their prohibitions and establishing clear mechanisms for reporting and enforcement. Specifically, the bill would:
Congress’s inherent power to conduct oversight and compel the provision of information — a key piece of our system of checks and balances — has come under increasing attack from the executive branch. The Congressional Subpoena Compliance and Enforcement Act would strengthen Congress’s tools to enforce subpoenas and gather the information it needs.
Articles about the measure include: Grant Tudor and Anne Tindall of Protect Democracy, “Scaling the Wall of Resistance: How Congress Can Compel Executive Branch Cooperation in a Jan. 6 Investigation.” (Just Security)
Background
Congress’s power to conduct oversight and secure information is a well-settled feature of our constitutional order. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress’s oversight power is “inherent,” a necessary corollary to its lawmaking role. To effectuate that oversight power, Congress has authority to enforce its information requests through various means, such as criminal prosecution, fines, and even arrest.
When requesting information from the executive branch, however, Congress has traditionally relied on an informal accommodation process to resolve disputes via negotiation. Yet in recent decades, presidential administrations of both parties have increasingly stonewalled Congress and successfully stalled its efforts to enforce subpoenas.
For example, during the Obama administration, it took nearly four years of negotiation and litigation before a U.S. district court forced the Department of Justice (DOJ) to comply with a subpoena from the House Committee on Oversight and Reform regarding the DOJ’s Operation Fast and Furious. Similarly, a settlement over the August 2019 subpoena against former Trump White House Counsel Don McGahn was not reached until May 2021, after a change in administrations. In these cases and others, the executive branch has faced no real cost for obstruction, only risking turning over the information Congress requested in the first place.
Reforms are needed if Congress is to receive information — especially from the executive branch — in a timely manner to inform its legislative and oversight work. Congress should clarify its powers, expedite enforcement procedures, and strengthen deterrents to ensure compliance with its subpoenas.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
The framers of our Constitution vested Congress with the power to tax and spend — the “power of the purse” — as a key check against executive power. Over time, however, the executive has abused flexibilities and authorities granted by Congress, and consequently has taken more control over federal spending.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes the Congressional Power of the Purse Act (CPPA), which would help Congress reclaim its constitutional authority over federal spending by increasing transparency of final spending decisions by the executive branch, improve reporting under the Antideficiency Act (ADA) and Impoundment Control Act (ICA), strengthen the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) ability to investigate and prevent violations of budget or appropriations laws, and restore checks and balances against executive authority to respond to emergencies.
Articles about the Congressional Power of the Purse Act include:
Background
Congress’s power of the purse is a key feature of our constitutional system of checks and balances. Congress has enacted various budget and appropriations laws foundational to its ability to protect its authority over taxing and spending decisions. The ADA prohibits federal agencies from spending funds that were not appropriated, whereas the ICA requires agencies to spend funds Congress appropriated and limits the president’s ability to interfere with such spending. Over time, however, presidents of both parties have exploited weaknesses and opacity in these and other budget and appropriations laws to circumvent congressional control over federal spending.
Presidents, working through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), have pushed the bounds of Congress’s limited delegations of authority to apportion, reprogram, and transfer funds. A lack of transparency around the ways OMB uses that authority prevented Congress from effectively exercising oversight of OMB’s compliance with budget and appropriations laws—prompting members to pass a law requiring OMB to disclose apportionments to Congress and the public on a public website
Current budget laws also lack sufficient enforcement mechanisms. While the ADA imposes penalties on government officials for noncompliance, the ICA does not, leaving few enforcement tools when funds are illegally withheld. Moreover, the executive branch has relied on legal opinions from the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and OMB to guide its understanding of what it means to comply with these budget and appropriations laws. These opinions may conflict with those of Congress and the GAO, and are often not even made public. In 2019, for example, OMB’s general counsel informed federal agencies they are not bound to report violations of the ADA to Congress and can ignore GAO decisions. To reverse this trend of executive overreach, Congress must strengthen its constitutional authority over the federal government’s purse strings.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
The Protecting Our Democracy Act and Congressional Power of the Purse Act contain national emergency reform provisions based on the ARTICLE ONE Act, first introduced in 2019. The provisions would restore the balance of national emergency powers and have received substantial bipartisan support in the Senate.
These provisions would strengthen Congress’s role in overseeing presidential emergency declarations under the National Emergencies Act. Given that the delegation of national emergency authorities poses serious challenges to Congress’s role in budget oversight, these provisions are part of a wider effort to reassert Congress’s power of the purse.
Articles related to the measure include:
Background
Emergency powers stem from Congress’s recognition that presidents should have the flexibility and power to respond to rapidly unfolding national emergencies. Under current law, the president is granted access to 123 special statutory powers once the president declares a national emergency. To mitigate potential abuses of power, the National Emergencies Act (NEA) was passed in 1976, paving the way for congressional oversight of emergency declarations. The Act created the following guidelines: the president must identify the powers invoked in an emergency proclamation, issue public updates if additional powers are invoked, and report any emergency-related expenditures to Congress every six months.
While the NEA intended for Congress to review and terminate emergencies when appropriate, it typically fails to do so. When Congress passed the NEA, the threat of a legislative veto, a resolution by one or both chambers of Congress disapproving presidential use of a delegated authority, was included as a check against the president’s emergency authority. The Supreme Court’s 1983 decision INS v. Chadha, however, undermined this powerful check on executive power when it held that acts of Congress without presidential signature were unconstitutional.
Post-Chadha, Congress must override a presidential veto to disapprove executive exercise of delegated national security powers. This has resulted in emergencies remaining in effect long after they should: as of June 2023, 41 states of emergency remain in effect, some dating as far back as 1979. Presidents are therefore able to bypass important constitutional boundaries; for example, a president can undermine Congress’s power of the purse by calling on national emergency authorities to reappropriate certain funds. Without a clear path to effectively review and end national emergencies, current emergency powers law lacks the guardrails necessary to stop abuses of power by the executive branch.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Insulating the Department of Justice (DOJ) from political meddling from the White House is essential to ensuring our democracy’s promise of equal justice under the law for all Americans. The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes the Security from Political Interference in Justice Act, which would increase transparency in the relationship between the DOJ and White House and strengthen protections against actual or perceived political interference in law enforcement decisions.
Articles about the measure include: Martha Kinsella, Daniel Weiner of the Brennan Center for Justice, “After four years of abuse, tangible fixes abound for restoring the rule of law.” (The Fulcrum)
Background
The promise of “fair and impartial” treatment under the law is a bedrock principle of American democracy and part of the DOJ’s stated mission. DOJ’s fairness and impartiality are essential to ensuring the rule of law and the public’s trust in the federal government and federal law enforcement.
Because the DOJ’s ability to enforce the law fairly and impartially would be threatened by either the appearance or effect of political interference, there has been longstanding bipartisan agreement that the White House should not weigh in — publicly or privately — on specific civil or criminal enforcement actions. To this end, every presidential administration since Watergate has issued guidance limiting contact between the White House and DOJ.
However presidents of both parties have violated the norm on occasion. President Nixon, for example, directed the DOJ to give a sweetheart settlement deal to I.T.T. in exchange for a donation to the 1972 Republican National Convention. President Clinton publicly called for the Oklahoma City bombers to be sentenced to death in the early days of the bombing investigation before they had their constitutionally-guaranteed day in court. More recently, President Trump repeatedly pressured the DOJ to take actions on specific enforcement matters, from the AT&T and Time Warner merger to the prosecutions of his National Security Adviser Michal Flynn and close associate Roger Stone.
Weaponizing the power to investigate, prosecute, and enforce the law to punish political opponents, help allies, or secure personal gain is a dangerous misuse of the presidency that severely undermines the rule of law. It is critical for our democracy that Congress prevent the executive from eroding DOJ’s independence through political interference.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: Much of Title VII was enacted separately in the 117th Congress as a part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act, so it is not included in the 118th Congress’s version of PODA. You can read more about those enacted provisions here and here.
Inspectors general (IGs) are critical checks against waste, fraud, and abuse across the federal government. Yet gaps in current law leave IGs vulnerable to abuses of presidential power, which undermines their mission. The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes the Inspector General Protection Act and the Inspector General Independence Act, which would ensure that IGs have the necessary independence and tools to faithfully execute the duties of their office.
Articles about the measure include: Liz Hempowicz and Melissa Wasser of the Project on Government Oversight, “It’s time to make it easier for watchdogs to work without interference.” (The Fulcrum)
Background
IGs investigate and report on concerns raised by employees of government agencies and are crucial in addressing malfeasance both within the government and throughout the private sector.
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress passed the Inspector General Act in 1978, which empowered IGs to identify areas for improvement in government programs and operations; investigate fraud and abuse and recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and ensure the heads of their affiliated federal agencies and Congress remain informed of potential issues in order to take corrective actions. The Act also established the framework for the Offices of Inspector General (OIGs), which now include 74 IGs, together with auditors and special agents. Thirty-seven of the IGs are presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, while the remaining IGs are selected by agency heads.
IGs conduct audits and investigations to determine areas of cost recovery, savings, and instances of wrongdoing. During fiscal year 2020 alone, IGs identified approximately $53 billion in potential savings and reported their work resulted in over 1,266 civil actions, 4,146 suspensions or debarments, and 4,146 indictments and pieces of criminal information.
IGs need protections to carry out their oversight free from political influence. The Inspector General Act accordingly outlines basic removal protections: Both houses of Congress must be notified at least 30 days before the removal or transfer of an IG, regardless of whether they are presidentially appointed or agency-designated. In crafting the IG Act, Congress designed this notification requirement to deter presidents from taking advantage of their unfettered removal authority and prevent them from replacing IGs without proper cause. However, presidents from both political parties have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to undermine Congress’s original intent. Moreover, the congressional notification requirement does not apply to individuals performing IG duties in an acting capacity, nor to cases where an IG’s personnel status is changed, such as placement on administrative leave. In these situations, Congress lacks the same visibility to question and address IG vacancies, which contributes to IG vacancies remaining for significant periods of time.
Between 2007 to 2016, 53 of the 64 major IG offices had vacancies that lasted from two weeks to six years. Better guardrails are thus needed to prevent removals or changes in personnel status that result in extended vacancies. This is especially apparent when considering former presidents’ retaliation against IGs. President Trump, for example, informed Congress on April 7, 2020 that he intended to dismiss Michael Atkinson, the IG for the Intelligence Community, after Atkinson notified Congress of a whistleblower complaint filed against the president. Rather than waiting 30 days to replace Atkinson, however, President Trump placed him on administrative leave immediately, effectively bypassing the 30-day notification requirement. President Obama similarly informed Congress he would remove Gerald Walpin, the IG for National Community Service, on the same day he suspended Walpin with pay.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would strengthen protections for IGs, and safeguard the independence of IGs by:
Note: This section appears as Title VII in the 118th Congress’s version of PODA.
Whistleblowers are indispensable to uncovering wrongdoing across our federal government. With around two million federal employees, the U.S. government is too large for congressional or agency oversight to capture all wrongdoing. Whistleblowers, who disclose fraud, waste, and abuse, are therefore critical in ensuring that our government functions effectively, efficiently, and lawfully, as well as a resource to help Congress fulfill its constitutional responsibility to conduct oversight. The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes the bipartisan Whistleblower Protection Improvement Act of 2021, which reinforces protections for federal whistleblowers and thereby strengthens Congress’s ability to stem budgetary waste and abuses of executive power.
Articles about the measure include:
Background
Congress has a long history of valuing and protecting whistleblowing. The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 granted federal employees the rights to “petition Congress or a member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or member thereof” and protected them from some forms of retaliation for presenting “grievances” to Congress. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 provided additional protections for federal whistleblowers from retaliation and streamlined review processes for whistleblower complaints and allegations.
Under current law, civilian federal employees, contractors, and grantees can directly contact congressional oversight committees, the offices of their representatives and senators, and/or select authorizing committees. Within the executive branch, whistleblowers can disclose information to agency leadership, inspectors general, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Office of Special Counsel, or the Government Accountability Office’s FraudNet system.
Despite these processes and protections, it remains difficult for whistleblowers to report issues and to vindicate their rights when they face retaliation.
First, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the three-member, quasi-judicial executive branch agency in charge of reviewing most whistleblowers’ retaliation complaints, has become a bottleneck. Unlike private-sector whistleblowers, federal employee whistleblowers cannot move their complaints to court, and must seek relief from the MSPB. Even when the MSPB functions, whistleblower retaliation cases can take years to resolve, and in cases where the MSPB’s lower-level administrative judges deny relief, whistleblowers are vulnerable to retaliation while they appeal.
Second, whistleblowers in the Intelligence Community (IC) have no access to the MSPB or courts; they can only petition Inspectors General in the IC, who can investigate their claim and issue an opinion that agency heads may ignore. In addition, the IC Inspector General may not directly transmit whistleblower complaints to Congress and, rather, must rely on the Director of National Intelligence to do so. As a result, whistleblowers in the IC can be ignored, silenced, and suffer retaliation under current law.
More broadly, federal whistleblowers lack protections against basic forms of retaliation, including harassing investigations, revocations of their security clearances, and disclosure of their identity. Strengthening whistleblower protections would not only protect those brave enough to come forward from unjust punishment, but also ensure that federal employees are not chilled from reporting waste, fraud, and abuse in the future.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: This appears as Title VIII in the 118th Congress version of PODA.
The Senate has a constitutional responsibility to give advice and consent on nominations of certain executive branch officials in order to hold them accountable to Congress and the American people. The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes the Accountability for Acting Officials Act, which would close problematic loopholes in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA) to help ensure the timely nomination and confirmation of qualified leadership across the executive branch.
Articles about the measure include:
Background
Since our country’s founding, there has been some provision for temporary leadership of federal government agencies in the absence of a Senate confirmed official. The FVRA sets the default rules for which officials may temporarily fill a vacant executive branch position requiring Senate confirmation, and limits on how long that temporary official may serve.
The FVRA rests on the assumption that the president and Senate will work as partners to nominate and confirm officials to these posts. Unfortunately, that has become less and less true in today’s polarized political environment. As a result, presidents of both parties have sought to skirt the constitutional requirement to seek the Senate’s advice and consent by abusing weaknesses or loopholes in the FVRA and its enforcement.
The FVRA has several weaknesses that have enabled presidents of both parties to evade the requirements of the law and rely upon acting officials to lead agencies. For starters, FVRA has no direct enforcement mechanisms, but relies on private parties — who often struggle to demonstrate standing to a court — to sue to overturn actions of an official serving unlawfully.
If a party does succeed in bringing a suit under the FVRA, the potential consequences include invalidation of any and all actions taken by the unlawfully acting official, which creates extraordinary uncertainty for businesses, consumers, and others who depend on that agency for regulations, grants, guidance, or federal law enforcement.
Furthermore, Congress often isn’t notified when positions are filled, leading to a lack of clarity and transparency about when vacancies have occurred — which is critical to understanding how long an acting official can lawfully serve.
While the FVRA sets a default that the “first assistant” to a vacant position can automatically take on the duties of the position on an acting basis, the statute fails to define “first assistant” or ensure that person has the qualifications and experience to step into the job. Some agencies have agency-specific statutes that interact with the FVRA in unclear ways, creating confusion about who should automatically serve if there is a vacancy, and who the president can designate to serve if they decide to select someone other than the first assistant.
The FVRA has been evaded by presidents of both parties. President Trump bypassed the Senate in unprecedented fashion to fill a wide range of positions — from U.S. Attorneys to Cabinet positions such as secretary of Homeland Security or attorney general — with acting officials. He even went so far as to express a preference for acting officials. In some cases, vacancies persisted so long that acting officials served out the time allowed under the FVRA only to have another acting official take their place. As of August 2020, the Trump administration had 136 vacancies requiring Senate confirmation that lacked an appointee.
President Obama also sometimes tried to bypass the Senate’s advice and consent; at the DOJ for example, Vanita Gupta performed the functions of Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division for over two years, beyond the term allowed under the FVRA. Acting officials also filled a wide number of inspector general roles as slots lacked Senate-confirmed appointees for long periods throughout President Obama’s tenure. With historically slow confirmation times and high nomination failure rates, the Obama Administration increasingly relied on acting officials in its second term.
Excessive use of acting or non-confirmed leadership unconstitutionally circumvents the Senate’s advice and consent responsibility, leaving acting officials who are less accountable to Congress and the American people. This may incentivize a president to rely more heavily upon acting leadership selected based upon their loyalty rather than their qualifications. Further, acting officials may not feel empowered to make necessary decisions, potentially crippling agencies for long periods of time. It is critical for our democracy, and the continued stability and functionality of our government, for Congress, particularly the Senate, to reassert its partnership role in the appointment process to prevent the executive from installing unaccountable acting officials.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: This title appears as Title IX in the 118th Congress’s version of PODA.
The Hatch Act is a federal law that ensures our federal government administers the law in a non-partisan fashion by preventing federal employees from engaging in partisan activities on the job. The law serves as a bulwark between partisan politics and the civil service, and helps ensure that the workforce staffing our federal agencies remains free from coercion to participate in or use their office to influence elections.
Unfortunately, the Office of Special Counsel charged with enforcing the Hatch Act has limited authority to discipline senior political appointees found to violate the law, and has limited ability to investigate potential violations of the law only when allegations of violations are made. The Hatch Act Accountability Act provisions included in the Protecting Our Democracy Act would strengthen enforcement of the Hatch Act and clarify that it applies to senior political appointees who work for the president and vice president.
The Hatch Act Accountability Act is Title X of the Protecting Our Democracy Act.
Articles about the measure include:
Background
The Hatch Act prevents federal employees from engaging in partisan political activities while they are on the job, or using federal government resources to engage in partisan politics. Federal employees are still allowed to engage in political activities privately, outside their work. The separation between their work for the government and any political activity helps to ensure that our laws and federal programs are administered in a non-partisan way. This separation also helps protect federal employees from being pressured or coerced by their superiors to engage in partisan political activities.
Unfortunately, there are a few weaknesses under the current law that have allowed violations of the Hatch Act, particularly by senior political appointees, to go unpunished. Under existing law, senior political appointees are exempt from the Office of Special Counsel’s enforcement of the Hatch Act, and can avoid consequences if the president decides not to discipline them for violations of the law. This has the potential to create a two-tier system that holds lower level civil servants responsible for violating the law but allows senior government officials to flout its restrictions with impunity.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: This title was included as a part of the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act, which was enacted as a part of the FY23 Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 2022.
The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 was enacted to promote a smooth transition between incoming and outgoing presidents, and guard against the risks to public safety or security caused by a disorderly transition. Since then, the law has been updated repeatedly — and on a bipartisan basis — to reflect the growing complexity of administrations and presidential transitions. The Protecting Our Democracy Act continues this tradition by amending the act to eliminate risky delays in the transition process when there is a delay in determining the apparent winners of an election for president and vice president. In the event of such delay, it would provide transition support to all qualified general election candidates while the winners are determined.
Background
The Presidential Transition Act mandates planning and activities around a possible change in Administration. In particular, it requires the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide support to candidates for president and vice president, and to a president-elect and vice-president elect in the period between the election and inauguration. Under the law, following the general election the GSA administrator is directed to ascertain the “apparent successful candidates” for president and vice president and provide certain access and support to those individuals and their staff.
Typically that “ascertainment” has been fairly swift and straightforward. But there are no clear guidelines for how the GSA administrator should make that determination or fallbacks should the ascertainment be delayed. So for instance, amid the contested 2000 presidential election, neither major candidate, George W. Bush or Al Gore, was ascertained to be the apparent winner and neither received the specified resources until mid-December, when Gore conceded. And in fall of 2020, the GSA administrator did not make the ascertainment in favor of President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris until November 23, 2020, notwithstanding the fact that the race had been called for them on November 7, 2020 by the major news outlets.
The Efficient Transition Act of 2021 would address the problem by specifying that if the GSA administrator does not make the ascertainment within 5 days of the general election, all of the qualified general election candidates will receive the support and access normally accorded the winner. This will continue until the GSA makes the ascertainment or until the conclusion of the counting of electoral votes by the Joint Session of Congress, whichever comes first. The bill also requires the GSA administrator to issue regulations establishing standards and procedures to be followed in making a future ascertainment determination.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
The president and vice president of the United States are both taxpayers and the overseers of the bureaucracy that enforces compliance with our nation’s tax code. The Protecting our Democracy Act would codify for the first time the longstanding norm of presidents, vice presidents, and candidates for those offices publicly releasing their tax returns. Doing so would ensure transparency over whether our highest office-holders are complying with the laws they are sworn to uphold and provide the voting public with an opportunity to scrutinize the finances of high office-holders for potential conflicts of interest.
This provision is Title XII of the Protecting Our Democracy Act.
It has also been introduced as stand-alone legislation by Rep. Eshoo, H.R. 347, the Presidential Tax Transparency Act, and similar provisions have been included in H.R.1 and S.1, the For the People Act.
Articles related to this measure include:
Background
President Nixon started the tradition of releasing tax returns in 1973, when he released his to tamp down controversy over an audit the Internal Revenue Revenue Service (IRS) was conducting of his taxes and questions over whether the IRS could effectively hold the head of the executive branch accountable for complying with the tax laws. Following Nixon, every president and presidential candidate voluntarily released their tax returns or some version of information from them, until President Trump exercised his legal right to keep his tax returns private. Notably, under the voluntary system, presidents and candidates made individual choices regarding the form of the tax data they released and the time frame the data covered.
In recognition of the strong governmental interest in ensuring that the holders of high office are not above compliance with the tax laws, the Protecting our Democracy Act makes presidential and vice presidential tax disclosures a legal requirement, creates a mechanism for enforcing it, and standardizes the information the public is entitled to receive. Its provisions would:
Note: These titles appear as Titles XI and XII in the 118th Congress’s version of PODA.
While the 2020 election was the most secure in our history, recent investigations have found that foreign actors have targeted activities toward political campaigns. The Protecting Our Democracy Act includes provisions that would bolster confidence in our democratic institutions by requiring campaigns to disclose offers of illegal campaign help from foreign governments, and clarify that federal law prohibits accepting opposition research and other non-public information from foreign governments.
Articles related to the measures include: Stephen Spaulding of Common Cause and Lisa Gilbert and Craig Holman of Public Citizen, “Two smart ways to deter foreign money and dirt-digging from our elections.” (The Fulcrum)
Background
Foreign attempts to interfere and influence our elections have been serious and persistent. Numerous studies by Congress, and executive branch agencies as well as Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III have been conducted, particularly in response to concerns about Russian interference in the 2016 election.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: This title was included in the version of PODA that passed the House in 2021, but it was not originally part of the introduced text. This section appears as Title XIII in the 118th Congress’s version of PODA.
Foreign efforts to influence our elections have increasingly taken the form of political ads on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Google. The content and purchaser of those ads is often obscured to the public because our laws have not been amended to reflect current technology. To address this issue, lawmakers have introduced the Honest Ads Act.
The Honest Ads Act is Title XIII of the Protecting Our Democracy Act (118th Congress). The legislation would enhance the integrity of our democracy by improving disclosure requirements for online political advertisements.
Articles about the Honest Ads Act include Tim Lau, “The Honest Ads Act Explained.” (Brennan Center for Justice)
By including this legislation among its vital reforms, the Protecting Our Democracy Act would:
Note: This title is new to the 118th Congress’s version of PODA.
Since the late 19th century, when Congress passed a law rejecting the longstanding “spoils” system of political patronage, the United States has aimed to protect the independence of government institutions and their employees through laws that require most positions within the federal government to be awarded on the basis of merit and make it difficult to fire civil servants for political reasons. In recent years, however, those protections have come under threat.
Standalone legislation to address this issue, the Saving the Civil Service Act Act, has been introduced by Representative Gerry Connolly and Senator Tim Kaine (H.R.1002/S.399). The Saving the Civil Service Act is Title XIV of the Protecting Our Democracy Act (118th Congress).
Background
In October 2020, then-President Trump issued the executive order “Creating Schedule F in the Excepted Service,” which established a new employment category for federal employees. Under the plan, tens of thousands of federal workers could be redesignated as “Schedule F” employees, effectively losing their employment protections.
On his first day in office, President Biden revoked that executive order, but the threat remains. In the run-up to the 2024 presidential campaign, officials close to Trump have indicated that he continues to explore reissuing the Schedule F executive order, should he win the Republican nomination and be voted back into office in 2024. Other candidates for the Republican nomination have indicated a willingness to explore similar efforts to weaken civil service protections.
The Protecting Our Democracy Act would protect the federal workforce from politicization by prohibiting the establishment of a Schedule F in the excepted service. Specifically, the bill would:
Portions of PODA are outgrowths of past Republican-led or supported legislation – policies that have long enjoyed bipartisan support. Below are pieces of PODA that have previously enjoyed Republican support:
